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lNcoMB TAX-AUTOMOBILE RECEIVED .AS PRIZE IN
SALES AGENCY DRAWING NoT lNcoMB-An automobile agency, as a means of
publicizing its new models, advertised that it would give a new car to one of
the persons visiting its showroom on a certain day. When plaintiff visited the
showroom on the day specified, an employee of the agency took her name, wrote
it on a slip of paper, and deposited it in a barrel. Plaintiff's name was drawn
from the barrel and she received the automobile. Plaintiff did not include the
value of the prize in computing her gross income for tax purposes, and a deficiency was assessed against her. Unsuccessful in her claim for a refund, plaintiff brought an action to recover the deficiency assessment. The court held:
the automobile was a gift under section 22(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
and plaintiff therefore had properly excluded its value in computing her gross
income. Bates 11. Glenn, (D.C. Ky. 1953) ll4 F. Supp. 445.
Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code broadly defines gross income;
section 22(b) lists the receipt of a gift as an exclusion from gross income.1 What
is a gift in this context?2 If the property received is not "income" within the
meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution,3 it clearly
would not be taxable.4 If the property received is income in the constitutional
sense, it generally is conceded that the court should consider all of the circumstances surrounding its transfer in determining whether it conforms to the legal
TAXATION-FEDERAL

1

I.R.C., §22.

''The broad import of gross income in §22(a) admonishes us to be chary of extending
any words of exemption beyond their plain meaning. . . • 'Gifts,' however, is a generic
word of broad connotation, taking coloration from the context of the particular statute in
which it may appear." Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 at 329-300, 63
S.Ct. 577 (1943).
3 See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189 (1920).
4 See Edwards v. Cuba R. Co., 268 U.S. 628, 45 S.Ct. 614 (1925).
2

932

M10HIGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 52

definition of a gift5-i.e., whether it is a voluntary transfer of property made
without contractual consideration6 but with donative intent. 7
Two lines of authority converge upon the principal case on the question of
what constitutes consideration. In the Robertson case,8 it was held that a prize
contributed by a philanthropist and won by a composer in a contest for the best
symphony was not a gift. The recipient of the prize had entered his symphony
pursuant to the terms of the contest offer, and his act of entry constituted the
consideration of a unilateral contract.9 On the other side is the "Pot O' Gold"
case,10 in which the taxpayer was called to the telephone and informed that a
radio program was sending her $900, the court holding that the prize was a
gift.11 Here no contract existed because the recipient, who had not been listening to the radio, had done nothing for the purpose of entering the contest. 12 In
the principal case the terms of the offer required the plaintiff to go to the showroom on the day specified and give her name to an employee of the agency in
order to enter the "contest." If plaintiff knew of the offer through the newspaper advertisements,13 the fact that she might have had an incidental purpose
in going to the showroom to see the new cars on display does not detract from
the character of that act as consideration.14 Requiring plaintiff to stay in the
showroom long enough to give her name in entering the contest would seem to
destroy the gratuitous nature of the transfer.15 Although at first glance the
consideration might not seem bargained for-going to the showroom and giving
one's name in return for a new automobile--closer scrutiny of the bargain
suggests a different conclusion. The agency in effect offered one chance in
27,000 (since that number of people visited the showroom) of winning a new
See Fisher v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1932) 59 F. (2d) 192.
Noel v. Parrott, ( 4th Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 669, cert. den. 273 U.S. 754, 47 S.Ct.
457 (1926).
7 Weagant v. Bowers, (2d Cir. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 679; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 at 730, 49 S.Ct. 499 (1929). On the requirement of donative
intent, however, cf. Helvering v. American Dental Co., note 2 supra.
s Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 72 S.Ct. 994 (1952).
9 But cf. McDermott v. Commissioner, (D.C. Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 585, where it
was held that the Ross Essay Contest Prize, awarded by the American Bar Association,
constituted a gift. That this decision no longer will be followed seems indicated by the
Robertson case, note 8 supra; United States v. Amirikian, (4th Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d)
442; and I.T. 3960, 1949-2 Cum. Bul. 13 (in which the Bureau of Internal Revenue
·specifically stated that it does not agree with the conclusion reached in the McDermott case).
10 Pauline C. Washburn, 5 T.C. 1333 (1945).
11 If the taxpayer is required to do something in connection with the radio program
in order to win the prize, such as answering a question correctly, the prize apparently
would be taxable income. See I.T. 3987, 1950-1 Cum. Bul. 9.
1 2 It is suggested in the opinion of the Pot 0' Gold case that the result might have
been different if the winner had been required to appear on the program, authorize the use
of her name in a product testimonial, or use the product. Pauline C. Washburn, note 10
supra.
13 See 1 CoRDIN, CoNTRACTs §§59-60 (1950), where it is doubted that knowledge
of a general offer before partial performance is necessary for acceptal).ce of a unilateral
contract.
14See Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass. 114 at 117, 60 N.E. 397 (1901).
15 See 1 CoNTRACTS R:EsTATBMBNT §§19(c), 76 (1932).
5
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car to those who would accept the offer in accordance with its terms. Requiring
the offerees to go to the showroom and stay long enough to give their names to
an employee was a material matter to the agency in achieving its primary purpose of showing and selling its new cars. Because of the existence of consideration, the principal case seems more like the Robertson case and can be distinguished from the "Pot O' Gold" case. Even in some circumstances where there
is no consideration, the courts have refused to designate the property received
as a gift because of other evidence of the nonexistence of donative intent.16 The
commercial purpose of the transferor,17 the existence of the employment relationship,18 or the fact that the transferor was a corporation not having power to
make a gift19 have been held to indicate a lack of donative intent.20 Evidence
of lack of donative intent in the principal case includes the facts that the agency
had a commercial purpose in using a contest to publicize its new cars21 and that
it deducted the cost of the prize automobile as an advertising expense for tax
purposes.22 Because the transfer was not gratuitous and because of the lack of
evidence of donative intent, it would seem that the court in the principal case
should have concluded that the automobile was not a gift.

Arthur M. Wisehart, S.Ed.
16 See Smith v. Manning, (3d Cir. 1951) 189 -F. (2d) 345; United States v. McCormick, (2d Cir. 1933) 67 F. (2d) 867 (tips received by a deputy city clerk for performing
a marriage ceremony are not gifts); Roberts v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d)
221 (tips received by a taxicab driver are not gifts); annotation, 10 A.L.R. (2d) 191 (1950).
17 See Schall v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 893, for an example of a
non-commercial purpose transfer of property.
·
18 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, note 7 supra; Botchford v. Commissioner,
(9th Cir. 1936) 81 F. (2d) 914; Willkie v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1942) 127 F. (2d)
953, cert. den. 317 U.S. 659, 63 S.Ct. 58 (1942). For cases which can be distinguished
in part because of the nonexistence of the employment relationship, see Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 58 S.Ct. 61 (1937); Lunsford v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1933)
62 F. (2d) 740.
19 Noel v. Parrott, note 6 supra. Cf. Blair v. Rosseter, (9th Cir. 1929) 33 F. (2d)
286 (in which the shareholders authorized the directors to make a gift); Cunningham v.
Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1933) 67 F. (2d) 205.
20 Since the prize in the Pot O' Gold case, note IO supra, was awarded as part of an
advertising scheme and therefore had a commercial purpose, it might be questioned whether
it should be treated as a gift. There is language in the opinion, however, indicating that
the prize might not be a "gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined"
(Eisner v. Macomber, note 3 supra, at 207) and therefore not taxable because it was not
income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.
21 For other situations in which prizes were awarded as part of an advertising scheme,
see I.T. 1667, II-8 Cum. Bul. 83 (1923) (restaurant gave tickets bearing a certain number
with each meal purchased and awarded an automobile at the end of six months to the
holder of the lucky ticket); I.T. 1651, II-6 Cum. Bul. 54 (1923) (prize given to the person
who could determine the greatest number of towns and cities correctly from pictures printed
in a newspaper each day for ninety days); Herbert Stein, 14 T.C. 494 (1950) (prizes
awarded by a brewing company for the seventeen best plans for post-war employment).
22 Willkie v. Commissioner, note 18 supra.

